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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

vs.

:

GORDON LEON WALLS

:

Case No. 20030139

Defendant/Appellant-

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This appeal is from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty by the
defendant to the charge of Murder, a first-degree felony. The plea of guilty was
taken before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan on the 26th day of March 2002.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA?
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for appeal
by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea ( R. 118), and hearings and a
ruling on that motion.(R. 183, 184)
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v.
1

Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)." The Court applies "the clearly erroneous
standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that
decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) "However, the
ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional
and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See
also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996).
POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO INSURE THAT A PROPER RULE 11
DETERMINATION OF VOLUNTARINESS WAS MADE?

PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was not fully preservedfor
appeal despite the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea ( R. 118), and
hearings and a ruling on that motion.(R. 183, 184), since the issue of the plea
bargain was not addressed in the motion.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: Since the issue was not addressed in the
Defendant's motion for a new trial, the plain error standard applies. "To establish
plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v.
Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah
Ct.App. 1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). "However, the
2

ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional
and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See
also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 76-5-203. Murder
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab
Act;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is
younger than 18 years of age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child
under Section 76-5-404.1;

3

(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of
another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another and thereby causes the death of another;
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted
commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted
commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate
offense; and
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is
4

killed in the course 01 me commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any
predicate offense;
i e i the actor recklessly causes the death of a. peace officer while in
the commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer u:.:.:: >_v

=

- r

(ii) interference w un a peace officer wnne maKing a lau iui arrest
under Section ~^~^~ M^ if the actor uses force against a peace officer;
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder but the
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder but special mitigation is
established under Section 76-5-205.5.
(3) Murder is a first-degree felony.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or
attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another i
attempted to cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there
is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not
legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) 1 ''tula* Subsection (4)|ci)(i> emolioiul distress dors nol im:lmlr
(l) a condition ivsulliiK! fro in inonliil
76-2-305; or

IIIIKNS

ns defined in Section

(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own
conduct.
(cj The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection
5

(4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection
(4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person
under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii)

attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.

Section 77-15-1- Incompetent person not to be tried for public offense.
No person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public
offense.

Section 77-18-5
Reports by courts and prosecuting attorneys to Board of Pardons and Parole. In
cases where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the judge and prosecuting
attorney may, within 30 days, mail a statement to the Board of Pardons and Parole
setting forth the term for which the prisoner ought to be imprisoned together with
any information which might aid the board in passing on the application for
termination or commutation of the sentence or for parole or pardon.
Section 77-27-5- Board of Pardons and Parole authority.
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision when
and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state,
persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or
correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise
limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have
their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or
terminated.
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e)
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: .
(1) If the defeixr- v rrt represented by counsel, v
waived the right to counsel and d^es not desire counsel;

- VA

.

igly

(2) the plea is \ :)li intai il) i nade;
(3) the ueieriaani know* oi the righi ;o ihe presumption ^f innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right ic a speed} public trial before an
impartial jur\. the rig!-., ; confront M\K cross-examine -:: • ;vr. . ..
prosecution witnesses, the righi to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable d.*"> \>»\i +u - the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis ror me pica. /\ uiciuu: !_\i^ \> sufficient if it establishes
that the charged crime was actually committed h\ the defendant or; if the
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution
has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows UK. minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable,
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for
each offense to whic^ a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
( 6 ) l; iiiC l e i i u e i e u pjcu o u

I L M I H WJ U

pi;*

•*•• •

.

-•

'

•••.< - - i / ' v c - ^ - n t ,

and !* •/ '•vha* ^-^M^T^nr ]T-^ hp^n n^-vh^l
( 7) tl le defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.

7

These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was originally charged in an information filed June 15, 2001
with the offense of Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-203 (R. 10). On June 15, 2001 the Defendant made an initial appearance
and the information was read (R. 16). On August 27, 2001 , the preliminary
hearing was held, and the Defendant was bound over for arraignment. (R. 78) The
case was eventually set for trial, which was scheduled for afive-dayjury trial to
begin on April 22, 2002. The Defendant ultimately entered a plea of guilty to the
offense of Murder, a first degree felony as charged, before the Honorable Judge
Pamela Heffernan on March 26, 2002.(R. 99)
On April 25, 2002, the Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his
guilty plea,(R. Ill) and after several delays the case was set for hearings and a
determination on the motion. On January 28, 2003, Judge Heffernan denied the
Defendant's motion,(R. 184) and sentenced the Defendant to an indeterminate term
of 5 years to life in the Utah State Prison. The prison term was commenced on that
8

i

•' 184/57) The Defendant has received an original hearing date before the

Board of Pardons in June 2016.
This judgment and conviction was entered on February 18, 2003,,, and the
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on F ebruary 21), Jlilb (R I 'll I

s r 4: i EMEN roF IJIK IM

is

I he [defendant \* a s originalb c! larged in an information dated June 15,
2001, with the offense of Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (R. 10).
After several court appearances the Defendant entered into plea negotiations,
nnr i

^ P March _; . ~uw_ i;^ Defendant .:_,;,

• : /•

:

**

•

incarceration between

"

-

,

3

i uidi lie serve a period of tunc of

,2 years." (R. 186/2)

At the time of the entry of the guilty plea, the trial court conducted a Rule 11
colloquy. Attorney Martin r ~ ^ : : represented UK Defendant at the hearing.
|K,IK() 2) The Defendant stated lha( hi, had talked In I L i II-JUS and if Ik I ad "any

iiinthiiiji, | he| fiiil need[edl t

• ' [the court] know that". (R. 186/4)

Ihe trial court then went though the Defendant's rights, including the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, Ihe right In a speed}' trial before an

9

impartial jury, the presumption of innocence, and the right to have the State pay to
subpoena any witnesses the Defendant desired for his defense. (R. 186/4,5) The
court further advised the Defendant of his right to confront the witnesses against
him, and the right not to testify at trial, and that his decision not to testify could not
be used against him. (R. 186/5) The court advised the Defendant that the State had
the burden of proof, and would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each element of the.(R. 186/6) The court then went though the elements of the
offenses to which the Defendant was pleading guilty. (R. 186/6) The-court advised
the Defendant that by pleading guilty he would be waiving these rights. (R. 186/5)
The trial court then went through the possible maximum sentences on the
charge to which the Defendant was pleading guilty, (R. 186/7) The court told the
Defendant "You should also be aware that just because the State writes a letter to
the parole authority doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation." To
which the Defendant answered, "Yeah, I've been told." (R. 186/7) The court
further advised the Defendant " So you shouldn't rely on anything that the State
has indicated they may or may not do in entering this sentence because you could
serve a lot longer than what they're going to recommend" (R. 186/7,8) The court
advised the Defendant that he had 30 days to withdraw his guilty plea, and that by
pleading guilty he had very limited appeal rights. (R. 186/8) The court established
that he was pleading guilty of his "own free will and choice" and that he was not

10

uindc! t lie* influenrt: nf .insthini1 lluit vuniilil iffnl his \\h\\\\\ In nil IT I I nowing
guilty plea. (R. 186/8-10) The Defendant did tell the court that he wras supposed to
be taking the prescription drug of Haldol and/or Thorazine, but that he was not
taking those medications. (R. 186'°,! 0) The court then asked the prosecutor to give
a factual basis for the plea, to w h,c.i ;he prosecutor gave ai; ..uc^^i, ...••. ..

•**• ^

-*

r J attacking me", and "Mr. Tillet

attacked me twice that night. The first time I didn't kick him in the head or
nothing. Then later that evening then [sic] he attacked me again. That's when he
got kicked in the head/' (R. 186/12)
The court then went though an expiation agreement
/ ui

• ..
• •r

. Defendai it had signe :1 It * as • : *' ~

•

.;:.:;:,
^- ' -

. .. •
:

•" "••.i:it

f
* »t

*\ snent, bi it tl mt the Defendant's a;! " •*; "-1 * * r *\ ^ {- ' ••.• ia n Lu him,

nut cAdCtiy word for word, but pretty muvii.

v k.

i&L, IJJ The court acknowledged

that "I don't think it's going to do a whole lot of good unless it was read word for
word, but I think I've covered his rights sufficiently anyway." I K, I \\h 14 i
Oi i \pfii 25, 2002, tl: le Defer idant filed a pro se i i lotioi I oi lettei I: :) \ ithdi a w

defenders file a forn lal motic i i (E 181/2) \ t the i lext hearing -:

'• -ipust 6, 2002

the defense requested that an alienist be appointed to assess the Defendant's mental
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status, specifically, his ability to have knowingly entered his plea of guilty, and the
court appointed two alienist to explore this issue. (R. 181/4-12) The court then
continued the case until November 20, 2002 for a hearing as to the Defendant's
competence to enter a plea. At that hearing two witnesses were called, Mr. Rhett
Potter, a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, and Dr. Rick Hawks, a psychologist.
Mr. Potter interviewed the defendant and found "Bottom line on it was that
seemed to me he was tracking appropriately, that he understood what the charges
were, he understood the possible penalties." (R. 183/17) He testified that the
Defendant told him that he heard voices, which had told him to enter the guilty
plea, but Mr. Potter stated, "With the information that he gave me about the way
the voices were ostensibly acting at that point in time did not seem consistent with
the way that auditory hallucinations work with a person who has schizophrenia."
(R. 183/20) Mr. Potter stated that at the time of the interview that he "felt him to
be competent" but that he didn't make a specific finding of competence for the
period of March 26, 2002. (R. 183/25)
Dr Rick Hawks also evaluated the Defendant for mental competency. He
testified that it was possible that the Defendant was faking mental illness.
(R. 183/32) He also found originally that the Defendant may have so mental
illness, including schizophrenia, but could not make such a finding, or rule such a
diagnosis out. (R. 183/32,33) Furthermore, he did not do an analysis of the

12

Defendant's mental stale as u( I he daU oi the | It a, an Il l h a r l n r e Ih " <" unit
liiidiiiiiiet! Illir hcannii, appointed iinothnr psychologist, and instructed both to
determine the Defendant's mental competency as of the date of the plea. (R.
183/63-67)
After additional examinations Dr. Hawks produced an amended report, and
testified on Jan28, 2003 ilim ^ inc nine or me p i c u\<. ^eicnau:. t

t <;;pcara:

to

comprehend and appreciate the chai ges ai id allegations against hin : i " (R 1.84/10)
"'< -!

H

-:-^

the

,\ ^

ounsel pertinent facts, events, and states

of mind,"' (R. 184/10) and was able to "adequately [comprehend] and [appreciate]
the range and nature of possible penalties."

/T?

1 S 4 1 - ) He understood the

adversary nature of the proceedings against hi in'" and manifested appropriate
courtroom behavior on M a n h 2(> [2(10?.]" \V 1 vl M" I I i I M Hawks tcstmeil (h.ii
*»chi/pplirenii' speef i inri""1 ".i

Ilk. Defendanl tlnl lw\e J liitirl.i! 11111 c • • -. • i m ill
psychotic thoi ight disorder, pei haps r ' (R 18 : I-/15)

Dr. Beverly O'Connor, a neuropsychologist was then called to testify. She
testified that although it was possible the Defendant was faking a mental illness,
she thought he was trying to cooperate, and not faking a mental illness, (R.,184/
_ ,^

^ n n o r opined Mini mi I \lan/b .""<(»' '(Hi1 ilk UetentLtiif u.)1. n >i

.-

* ' *

.

*
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'

:

delusional disorder, or a

paranoid schizophrenia, combined with a low verbal IQ, combined with verbal
comprehension difficulties." (R. 184 / 35)
The court then ruled, "Mr. Walls was competent to enter his plea, that he did
knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea." (R. 184/51), and that the preponderance
of the evidence indicated that the Defendant was malingering. (R. 184/53) The
court then sentenced the Defendant to an indeterminate term in the Utah State
Prison of 5 years to life, with a recommendation of credit for time served. The
prison term was commenced on that day. (R. 184/57)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to plea negotiations on
March 26, 2002. At the time of the entry of his pleas of guilty, the Defendant was
present in court and the trial court commenced a Rule 11 (Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure) colloquy. The Defendant was suffering from a mental illness, for
which prescription medication had been prescribed, but which the Defendant was
not taking. The Defendant was suffering from "a probable mental illness that was
either some kind of delusional disorder, or a paranoid schizophrenia, combined
with a low verbal IQ, combined with verbal comprehension difficulties/' (R. 184 /
35) Although the court made a finding that the defendant was competent to enter
his plea, the evidence would suggest that there were questions as to the
Defendant's mental ability to enter the plea, and therefore the Defendant was

14

entitled to have his i i i n e h filed motion " v i'klr;pv '»'p pint urantu'

I'ho M" jl «, mirt

denkvl \hv< 111 c > i ii * ni ni I'urtluTinoiv (lie Defendant pled tmiltv pursuant to a plea
negotiation in

AiA

L«L defendant was offered, that the

prosecution would recommend tr me BoarJ of Pardons that he serve 1 0 to 12
years, was an illusory promise that both the prosecution and defense counsel would
know had no effect on the Defendant's prison sentence.
' ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ~^NYINC TTIF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS G U U / i l
PLEA
"I »n March J<>, JI'OOJ! ihe Defendant entered a guilty plea . . .*>i~ ,cuiw ^

i

. .
ill' " Defendant

••'•;.'••

.;,...,.

., 111C irial court thereafter

held several hearing, including tw o da> s of evidentiary hearings on the
Defendant's motion, including the testimony of three alienists w ho testified as to
the Defendant's probable mental state at the time of the entry o; p^a. A;-er :hose
hearings, he trial court denied tit le Defer idai it s i i lotioi l tc • \ v ithdi a\ v 1 lis plea.

: -^ "

"-

:

;'

*

Iciiiui uf a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." I lie Court has further noted that
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it applies "the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made
in conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah
1999) "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556,
558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)
The trial court therefore, must ensure that the Defendant's plea has strictly
met all the requirements of Rule 11, as well as meeting all .constitutional
requirements, and any failure in the process requires the granting of a subsequent
motion by the Defendant to withdraw his plea. A trial court abuses its discretion by
failing to grant the motion to withdraw the plea when a Rule 11 violation is
present. In State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117,123 the court held:
We hold the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying Mora's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court that accepted the
plea failed to strictly comply with rule 11 when it accepted Mora's
guilty plea without correctly incorporating the affidavit into the record
or establishing elsewhere on the record that Mora knew the State was
required to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
See also State v. Dean, 57 P.3d 1106 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002) where the Court reversed
a denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea where the trial court violated
Rule 11 by failing to advise him of his speedy trial rights. The Court in State v.
Dean, ruled that the failure to advise under Rule 11 constituted plain error.
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In the present case, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his plea,
based in part on Rule 11 violations of voluntariness. The Defendant was suffering
from a significant mental illness, and was not taking his prescribed medication at
the time the plea was taken making the issue of mental competence and therefore
voluntariness an issue. The reviewing trial court made a ruling in violation of the
strict compliance requirement of Rule 11, and therefore abused its discretion.
In the case oi Jacobs v. State, 20 P.3d 382 (Utah 2001) the court, in denying
a ten year post conviction habeas corpus petition noted that, -'"A mentally
incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings against such a
defendant do not comport with due process.' State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236
(Utah 1989) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (I960))." In the case of
York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) this Court held: "Due
process requires that a defendant be competent to plead guilty, (citing Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975))"
This concept is not only mandated by due process requirements, but is
statutory as well. UCA §77-15-1 provides that, "[n]o person who is incompetent to
proceed shall be tried for a public offense."
In the present case, although the trial court held a hearing to determine
competency, the court abused it's discretion in denying the Defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea due to the Rule 11 voluntariness issue. Both psychologists
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acknowledged that the Defendant most likely had a mental illness at the time of the
plea. Dr. Hawks testified that the Defendant did have a mental illness in the
"schizophrenic spectrum", "a psychotic thought disorder, perhaps." (R. 184/15)
and Dr. O'Connor testified, "I felt like he had a mental illness - a probable mental
illness that was either some kind of delusional disorder, or a paranoid
schizophrenia, combined with a low verbal IQ, combined with verbal
comprehension difficulties." (R. 184 / 35)
Both psychologists understood that at the time of the entry of plea, the
Defendant was prescribed but was not taking either of two medications (Haldol or
Thorizine, (R. 186/9,10)) to treat a suspected mental illness.
Although Dr. Hawks, as well as Mr. Potter believed that the Defendant was
malingering, (R. 183/32), and Dr. O'Connor conceded that the Defendant might be
malingering, (R.184 / 27,33) there is sufficient doubt as to the Defendant's mental
state at the time of the guilty pleas to require the trial court to allow the
Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO INSURE THAT A PROPER RULE 11
DETERMINATION OF VOLUNTARINESS WAS MADE.
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Murder, a firstdegree felony, as charged in the original information. The plea negotiation process
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resulted in only one promise or supposed benefit to the Defendant by entering into
the plea. The Defendant was promised that the prosecution would write a letter to
the Board of Pardons recommending that he serve a sentence of a maximum of 10
to 12 years on the charge. That single promise induced the Defendant to plead
guilty, and that single promise was known by both the prosecution as well as
defense counsel to have little or no effect on the Board of Pardons decision on the
Defendant's parole date.
In the case of State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the
Court ruled that, "[b]oth the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals
have allowed a Rule 11 challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be considered
for the first time on appeal." Further, in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242
(1969) the Supreme Court reversed a guilty plea holding: "It was error, plain on the
face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an
affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Although in the Boykin
decision, the Court was presented with a plea to a then capital offense and the court
taking the plea did not ask any questions regarding the plea, the fundamental
principles are the same.
In the case of State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 the Court ruled: "To
establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. (See
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also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). In the case of State
v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held "Under [the plain
error] standard, we will not reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and
that the error was both obvious and harmful". See also State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d
1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)1 where the Court addressed the issue of plain
error in a Rule 11 violation case, and stated:
To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of
showing "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993);
Further, in State v. Ostler the Court reversed the defendant's conviction having
found plain error in holding: "We hold that the trial court erreo^ by failing to
strictly comply with Rule 11(e). That error should have been obvious to the trial
court and was prejudicial to defendant." (State v. Ostler infra at 1072)
Utah appellate courts have consistently ruled that a Rule 11 violation
constitutes plain error. In the case of State v. Dean, 57 P.3d 1106, 1109 (Utah Ct.
App. 2002) the Court ruled:
Finally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the omission
dealt with a substantial constitutional right. It is well established under
Utah law that we will presume harm under plain error analysis when
a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights
under rule 11.
1

Affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court without analysis, State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d
528 (Utah 2001)
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See also State v. Tarnawiecki, 5 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) where the
Court was presented with a case wherein the trial court failed to advise the
defendant of her right to a "speedy trial before an impartial jury" during the Rule
11 colloquy. In that case the Court ruled that the error "should have been obvious
to the trial court... and [was] prejudicial and therefore harmful". (Id at 1228)
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in relevant
part: "The court .... may not accept the plea until the court has found ... (2) the
plea is voluntarily made".
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,
1274 (Utah 1988) held "Brady and Hammond2 require that in order for a plea to be
voluntarily and knowingly made, the defendant must understand the nature and
value of any promises made to him." (emphasis added) In the Copeland decision,
the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further findings regarding
the defendant's mental state and his understanding of the plea negotiation
promises. However, the Court noted:
There are several problems with the plea bargain entered into by
defendant. First, it appears either that he misunderstood the promise
the State made to him regarding its sentencing recommendation or
that the promise was illusory. Second, and more serious, is the claim
that defendant's understanding of the promise caused him to be misled

2

Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 742 (1970)
Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975)
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about the sentencing options available to the court and therefore the
value of the bargain into which he was entering. (Id. at 1274)
In the present case, the Defendant was clearly deceived by the plea
negotiations. Admittedly, the trial court pointed out to the Defendant "You should
also be aware that just because the State writes a letter to the parole authority
doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation." To which the Defendant
answered, "Yeah, I've been told." (R. 186/7 emphasis added) That caution by the
trial court is insufficient, and in fact implies that there is significant benefit to the
letter of recommendation.
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 742
(1970), the United States Supreme Court held:
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business
(e.g. bribes)."
(emphasis added)
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Norris, 57 P.3d 238, 241
(Utah Ct. App. 2002) reversed a defendant's conviction by guilty plea, when it
determined:
Both the trial court and the State clearly promised Norris that he could
pursue a claim for vindictive prosecution on appeal, but neither the
court nor the State could fulfill that promise. The court's legal error
exaggerated the benefits Norris would receive from pleading guilty.
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Thus it misled Norris as to "the nature and value of [the] promise[]
made to him." (Quoting State v. Copeland at 1274.)
The Court held: "Thus, Norris's pleas were not made voluntarily with full
knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty." (Id. at 241)
In the present case, the trial court failed to strictly comply with the Rule 11
requirements during the taking of the Defendant's guilty plea. In harmony with the
Utah Appellate Courts {State v. Dean, State v. Tarnawiecki, and State v. Ostler
infra) any Rule 11 violation should have been obvious to the trial court.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently held that a Rule 11 violation is presumed
to be harmful. Therefore, all three prongs of "plain error" as reiterated in State v.
Bradley infra have been met, and this Court should reverse the trial courts denial of
the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to establish the basic requirement of
Rule 11, in that the court did not ensure that the plea was voluntarily taken.
Specifically, the court, knowing that the only concession to the Defendant in the
plea to the crime as charged in the original information was the letter by the
prosecution to the Board of Pardons, did not make an adequate record to ensure
that the Defendant did in fact "understand the nature and value of any promises
made to him." {State v. Copeland infra emphasis added) Furthermore, the trial
court took a plea of guilty to a case in which the defendant "misunderstood the
promise the State made to him regarding its sentencing recommendation or [did
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not understand] that the promise was illusory." (State v. Copeland infra) The trial
court "exaggerated the benefits [the defendant] would receive from pleading guilty.
Thus it misled [the defendant] as to 'the nature and value of [the] promise[] made
to him.9" (State v. Norris infra)
It has been long established that the even the trial court, let alone the
prosecution, has no power to bind the Board of Pardons in their decision on parole
dates of inmates. In the case of Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) the court held: "In accordance with our sentencing scheme, the Utah
Supreme Court has consistently held that 'the power to reduce or terminate
sentences is exclusive with the Board [of Pardons]/ (citing McCoy v. Harris, 108
Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721,(1945)" Further, UCA §77-27-5(1 )(a) provides in relevant
part:
The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in ... all
felony cases ... may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their
sentences commuted or terminated.
In the present case the trial court failed to properly inform the Defendant of
the clearly established law regarding the effect of any recommendation to the
Board of Pardons. By allowing the Defendant to assume that the prosecution's 10

3

Defendant acknowledges that UCA § 77-18-5 provides for a prosecutor to provide
written recommendations to the Board of Pardons within 30 days of sentence.
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to 12-year maximum sentence recommendation would have any effect on the
Board of Pardon's ultimate decision as to the Defendant's parole date, the trial
court, in essence, participated in a illusory fiction that clearly played a role in the
Defendant's decision to plead guilty. The trial court could have prevented this
error by simply informing the Defendant that the effect of such a letter is minimal
in the Board of Pardon's parole date decision.
The State may argue that even with the failure of the trial court to establish a
legal factual basis for the plea, the conviction should stand on the grounds of
harmless error. The Courts have held that an error in a Rule 11 colloquy is not
harmless. In the recent case of State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, the court was
presented with a guilty plea that was taken with a Rule 11 colloquy that was
defective in that the court failed to inform the defendant "the State must prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"4. (Id. at f22) Given that failure only, the Court
reversed his conviction on the grounds that the Court presumed harm because, "by
not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a
fully informed decision." State v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 101, 104 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). "If
the defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the

4

In State v. Mora, (Infra) the Court found the Rule 11 colloquy defective even
where there was an affidavit in advance of plea signed by the defendant but not
properly incorporated into the record.
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guilty plea cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and
still claim to have done justice." (State v. Mora at *J22)
There exists a fundamental unfairness when a defendant is told that there is a
benefit to a prosecutor's recommendation to the Board of Pardons, when in fact
that promise, although given, is of minimal effect. Unfortunately, in the case at bar,
the trial court participated in this fallacy, and in fact gave the illusory "plea
bargain" further credence by stating "just because the State writes a letter to the
parole authority doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation". (R.
186/7 emphasis added) While recognizing that the trial court did inform the
Defendant that he may in fact serve more time than would be recommended by the
prosecution, the fact that the court treated this recommendation as an "agreement"
(R. 186/2) gives the illusion that the plea bargain is in fact a bargain.
The Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and face this
charge due to his misunderstanding of the effect of the prosecutor's
recommendation. The Defendant's statements at the time of entry of the plea
indicated that he may have a valid defense of self-defense, and he relinquished that
defense under the impression that he was getting some benefit from the
prosecutor's agreement. The Board of Pardons gave the Defendant no benefit from
the prosecutor's letter, and this Court should not allow a guilty plea to stand when
it was obtained under a misunderstanding by the Defendant.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the failure of the trial court to properly advise the Defendant of
his rights, specifically failing to make a proper finding of competence for the plea
pursuant to the Rule 11 requirements, and based upon the fact that the plea was
entered under an illusory promise, the Defendant respectfully requests this court
reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand for farther proceedings^
DATED this 2 , day of July, 2003.
W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant
LNDALL
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ADDENDUM A

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO.

80346

PRISON NO.

34293

nsideration of the Status of WALLS, Gordon Leon

e above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board
Pardons on the 18th day of March, 2003, for:

SCHEDULING ORIGNAL HEARING
ter a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board
kes the following decision and.order:

RESULTS
Schedule for an Original Hearing in
06/2016.

Crime
MURDER

Sent Case No.
5-L 0L1902755

Judge
HEFFERNAN

Expiration
LIFE

is decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at
y time until actual release from custody.
order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date
th day of March, 2003, affixed my signature as Chairman for and
behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

M. R. Sibbett, Chairman

ADDENDUM B

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR^Z li'H i! i A
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

.-. _- .-

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

r 10

vs.

Case No. 011902755

GORDON L.WALLS,

JUDGE PAMELA HEFFERNAN

$&

DEFENDANT.

I, Gordon L Walls, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that I
understand the following facts and rights;
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

A.

Murder

DEGREE

1 st-Dearee
Felonv

PUNISHMENT
MIN/MAX AND/OR
MINIMUM MANDATORY

5-years to life U S P &/or
$10.000 00 fine

B.
C
D.
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading
guilty (or no contest).
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The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
That I Gordon L. Walls on or about June 11, 2001. (a) intentionally or knowingly cause the
death of Craig Tillet: and/or (b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to Craig Tillet committed
an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Craig Tillet; and/or (c) acting
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life engaged in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to Craig Tillet and thereby caused the death of Craig Tillet
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes) I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest)'
That I beat up the victim Craig Tillet and kicked him in the head causing his death
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

I am entering these pleas voluntarily I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and the United States I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no
contest) I will give up all the following rights
COUNSEL: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me I understand that I
might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
service to me

I\havenot) waived my right to counsel If I have waived my right to counsel, I have done
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no
contest) I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s)
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney's are Stephen A Laker & Martin V
Gravis, My attorneys and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
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my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)

JURY TRIAL. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

I know that if Iwere to

have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me
I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
would pay those costs
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES.

RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

I know that if I

were to have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf I al^o know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I
also know that if I chose not testify, the jury would be told that they could nottiold my refusal to
testify against me
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s) If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and
my case will be set for a trial At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element
of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be
unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty

I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumpton of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest)
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA
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POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleding guilty (or not contest)
to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory
penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
TERMS. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the another (consecutively), or they may run at
the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or
no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record
that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURENT PRISON

PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is) the result of a plea bargain between
myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain,
if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:
The State agrees to affirmatively recommend to the parole board that the defendant's term of
incarceration be for a period of 10 to 12 years rather the normal period for the charge the
defendant has pled guilty to. (Upon the understanding of Defense Counsel, the Prosecuting
attorney and myself is normally 23 years.)
I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not bindng
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me at to what they believe the judge
may do are not binding on the judge.
TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND.

DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
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statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am 29 years of age. I have attended school through the 11th Grade. I can read and
understand the English language If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair
my judgement when I decided to plead guilty I am not presently under the influence of any drug,
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me for understanding what I am doing or from
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guitly (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final
judgement had been entered I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I shov/good cause I
will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any rason
Dated thisjj^ day of

lM^£(^~

,2002

4W^ ?rfm.

GORDON L WALLS
DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for Gordon L Walls, the defendant above, and that I know
he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her, I have discussed it with
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically compentent To the best ofmy knowledge and belief, after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true
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STEPHEN A. LAKER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

Bar No. 1870

MARTIN V. GRAVIS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

Bar No. 1237

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Gordon L. Walls,
defendant. I have reviewed this statement of Defendant andfindthat the factual basis of the
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. 'No improper
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea
negotiations are fully contained inthe Statement and in the attached Plea Agrement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) for
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public
interest.

DEE SMITH
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

Bar No.8685

-M^f~^
WILLIAM F.DAINES
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

BarNo.0805

ORDER

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and
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voluntarily made
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s)
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this $Xs day of

//JO/AJ^Q/.

PAMEL^EFFW^N'
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM C

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2 I

MR. GRAVIS:

3

THE COURT:

4

Mr. Walls here, Your Honor.
Okay.

This is the State of Utah versus

Gordon Walls, case number 11902755.

This is on for — it

5 I indicates a change of plea.
6

Is that correct, Mr. Gravis?

7

MR. GRAVIS:

That is correct, yes, Your Honor.

The

8

defendant at this time will be entering a plea of guilty as

9

charged.

As part of the plea negotiation, the State has

10

agreed to recommend to the parole board that he serve a — a

11

period of time of incarceration between 10 and 12 years.

12
13

i

14

THE COURT:

Is that correct, Mr. Daines?

MR. DAINES:

It is correct, Your Honor.
J

THE COURT:

Now, with regard to any recommendations,

15

Mr. Walls, that may be what the State is going to do and I

16

think —

17

that, they would be obligated to do that —

if —

if they've indicated that they are going to do

18

MR. DAINES:

19

THE COURT:

20

We would be.
—

as part of this agreement, but that

doesn't involve the Court in any way.

In other words, I will

21 I not be writing a letter in your behalf or indicating a
22

concurrence with that recommendation.

23

any letter.

I likely won!t write

Okay?

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

(Nods head.)

Just so you know that I!m not involved

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 395-1055

ADDENDUM D

7

THE COURT:

Okay,

If you plead guilty you're

admitting these elements and no proof will be presented.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah, I know.

The charge carries with it up to a life

imprisonment, five years to —
MR. GRAVIS:

five —

is it 15 to —

Five.

MR. DAINES: Five.
THE COURT:
MR. DAINES:
THE COURT:

Five to life.

That's right.

Indeterminate.
Indeterminate sentence.

It would be

five years minimum to life in prison.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, I know.

You should also be aware that just

because the State writes a letter to the parole authority
doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Pardon me?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah, I've been told.

Yeah, I've been told that.

Okay.

And what they will do is —

I have no way of predicting that either.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I —

You understand?

Yes.

So you shouldn't rely on anything that

the State has indicated they may or may not do in entering
this sentence because you could serve a lot longer than what

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R,
(801) 395-1055

c

they're going to recommend.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah, I know.

Okay.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

You understand all that?

(Nods head.)

Yes?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

You have 30 days from the date

you're sentenced to move to withdraw your guilty plea. You
have 30 days from the date you're sentenced to file an
appeal.

But once you've pled guilty, your appeal rights are

very limited after that.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT:

No.

THE COURT: Are you doing this of your own free will
and choice?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Has anybody made any promises to you in

exchange for this plea, other than the State indicating
they'll write this letter making the statement —
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
amount —

—

No.
that they recommend a certain

number of years in prison?
THE DEFENDANT:

No, nobody has.

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 395-1055

